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SWIFT v. TYSON - WHAT REMAINS ?
WHAT IS (STATE) LAW?
EDWARD S. STInvSON
In Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins' the "general law" doctrine estab-
lished in Swift v. Tyson2 -was repudiated. In view of this it may be well
to reexamine Swift v. Tyson to see what the problem which confronted the
federal court was and whether or not its solution depended upon Story's
broad generalizations. Although Story's sweeping pronouncements are shown
to be unsound, it may be that the Court was confronted with a problem of
some difficulty which will be found recurring in many of the cases arising
under the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction which were decided by relying
upon the repudiated doctrine. If so, some thought should be given to this
problem in order that the district courts may know how to proceed in like
cases without the "general law" doctrine.$
SwIFT v. TYSON
In Swift v. Tyson4 the question was whether an antecedent debt was value
for the transfer of a negotiable instrument so as to make the transferee of
the drawer-payee a holder in due course free from the defense of fraud which
the acceptor had against the drawer-payee. The transferee, apparently a
citizen of Maine, sued the acceptor, a citizen of New York, in the Circuit
Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. It was
doubtful what the law of New York was on the question and the court
divided on it. The question whether the defendant was entitled to the same
defense as he would have had against the drawer-payee was taken to the
United States Supreme Court on a certificate of division. justice Story said
that defendants argued: that Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 17891 required
the application of state law; that the applicable law was the law of New York
whose law governed because the contract was made there when the defen-
dant accepted the draft; and, that by that law a pre-existing debt did not con-
158 Sup. Ct. 817 (Apr. 25, 1938). Articles on this case which have so far appeared are
Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson (1938) 47 YALE L. 3. 1336; McCormick and
Hewins, The Collapse of "General" Law in the Federal Courts (1938) 33 ILL. L. Riv.
126; Schmidt, Substantive Law Applied by Federal Courts-Effect of Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins (1938) 16 TEx. L. Rlv. 512; Schweppe, What Has Happened to Federal
Jurisprudence? (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 421; Jackson, The Rise and Fall of Swift'v.
Tyson (1938) 24 A. B. A. 3. 609; Powell, The Constitutional Convention and Swift v.
Tyson (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 862.
-16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842).3Sharp and Brennan, The Application of the Doctrine of Swift v. Tyson Since 1900
(1929) 4 IND. L. 3. 367, shows the large number of lower federal court decisions in
which the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson has been applied.
"Supra note 2.
51 Stat. 73, 92 (1789) ; 28 U. S. C. A. § 725 (1927).
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stitute value. Story proceeded to examine the law of New York, found that
the New York Court of Errors had never been called upon to decide the
question and that the Supreme Court of New York had -decided it both ways,
three decisions holding that an antecedent debt was not value, being pre-
ceded by one and followed by two holding the contrary.6 In the three de-
cisions first mentioned, the Supreme Court had misinterpreted a Court of
Errors decision. 7 justice Story said, " . . . it admits of serious doubt,
whether any doctrine upon this question can at present be treated as finally
established" (in New York).8
Instead of doing what the New York Court of Errors would have done-
that is, examining the question anew, considering what the rule ought to be
in New York, and, in this connection, considering the general objective of
the "law merchant", the practice of business men, the persuasive force of
authority elsewhere, etc. etc.-Story said that, admitting the law of New
York to be that a pre-existing debt did not constitute value, the federal court
was not obliged to apply it but could decide the question for itselfig The
whole statement of this doctrine is contained in a single paragraph of the
opinion a page and a half in length,10 much of which is unquestionably sound
as a description of the judicial process in deciding a case when the decisions
of the courts of the state whose law is applicable are conflicting. Section 34
of the Judiciary Act of 1789 is as follows:
"The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution, treaties,
or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall
be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the Courts
of the United States, in cases where they apply.""
Story said that the word "laws" in this section did not apply to the decisions
of state courts on questions of a "general nature, especially to questions of
general commercial law". He said that the term laws was to be understood
as meaning "statutes", "the construction thereof adopted by the local tribu-
nals", "long established local customs having the force of laws", and "rights
and titles to things having a permanent locality, such as the rights and titles
to real estate, and other matters immovable and intraterritorial in their na-.
ture and character". His reasons for this interpretation were (1) the idea
that there was an all pervading common law, the principles of which were
'16 Pet. 1, 16-17 (U. S. 1842).7Bay v. Coddington, 5 Johns. Ch. 54, 9 Am. Dec. 268 (1821), aff'd, 20 Johns. 637,
11 Am. Dec. 342 (1822).
816 Pet. 1, 17 (U. S. 1842).
'Professor Thayer pointed out that this statement was dictum. Thayer, The Case of
Gelpcke v. Dubuque (1891) 4 HA v. L. R~v. 311, 314.
'16 Pet. 1, 18-19 (U. S. 1842).
'11 Stat. 73, 92, (1789); 28 U. S. C. A. § 725 (1927).
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independent of the decisions of the courts of any particular sovereignty,12
and (2) the theory that decisions are not laws but only evidence of them.
He said: "In the ordinary use of language it will hardly be contended that
the decisions of courts constitute laws. They are, at most only evidence of
what the laws are, and not of themselves -laws. They, are often reExamined,
reversed, and qualified by the courts themselves, whenever they are found
to be either defective, or ill-founded, or otherwise incorrect."' s
ERIE RAILROAD COMPANY V. TOMPKINS
While walking along a footpath beside the Erie Railroad Company's track
in Pennsylvania, Tompkins was struck by something projecting from one of
the cars of a passing freight train. Tompkins, a citizen of Pennsylvania, sued
the Erie, a New York Corporation, in the Federal District Court for the
Southern District of New York. The parties differed about what the law of
Pennsylvania was. The Erie claimed that by the law of Pennsylvania *its
only duty toward persons using longitudinal footpaths on the right of way
was to refrain from willful or wanton injury, relying on a case decided by
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Tompkins insisted that defendant was
liable for injuries resulting from ordinary negligence; that is, it had a duty
to exercise due care. He relied upon many other Pennsylvania decisions. He
also claimed that the question was one of "general law" which the federal
court could determine for itself independent of the Pennsylvania decisions.
The trial judge refused to rule -that the applicable law precluded recovery and
the jury's verdict was for the plaintiff.
The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff on
the ground that it was unnecessary to consider what the law of Pennsylvania
was because the question was one of the general law by which the railroad's
duty was to exercise due care. The Supreme Court, two justices dissenting,
held that it was error to refuse to apply Pennsylvania law and that it was
the court's duty to decide what the state law was. It reversed the decision
and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. It
held that the term "laws" in the thirty-fourth section of the Judiciary Act
of 1789 meant all the law of a state, unwritten or common law as well as
statutes, repudiating the "general law" doctrine established in Swift v. Tyson.
The principal reason for the change' 4 was the research of Charles Warren
who discovered the original draft of the section which was as follows:
"'The law respecting negotiable instruments may be truly declared in the language
of Cicero, adopted by Lord Mansfield in Luke v. Lyde, Z Burr. R. 883, 887, to be hi a
great measure, not the law of a single country only, but of the commercial world." "16
Pet. 1, 19 (U. S. 1842).
116 Pet. 1, 18 (U. S. 1842). See Dobie, Seven Implications of Swift v. Tyson (1930)
16 VA. L. Rav. 225, 231.458 Sup. Ct. 817, 819 (1938).
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laws
"And be it further enacted, that the statute law of the
A
several states in for-.e for the time being nd their 
rit-4ten orF common law now in use, whether by adoptior
fromi~ the common law of England, the aneicnt statiates
of the same or ;thPrwipc, except where the constitution,
treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision
in the trials at common law in the courts of the United
States in cases where they apply."'15
The word "laws" was substituted for the portions struck out indicating
clearly that the word "laws" was intended as a substitute not only for
"statute law" but also for "unwritten or common law now in force."
The majority opinion denies that there is "a transcendental body of law
outside of any particular state but obligatory within it unless and until
changed by statute" saying that the common law enforced in a state is not
the common law generally but the common law of that state.16 No advice
is given to the Circuit Court of Appeals on how to ascertain the law of a
state where the decisions of that state's courts are conflicting and no theory
of the nature of law is indulged in. Justice Butler's dissenting opinion dis-
agrees with the new construction of the statute on the ground that the failure
of Congress to amend the act during nearly a hundred years since the inter-
pretation in Swuift v. Tyson indicates that it intended that the statute should
continue to mean what the court said it meant in 1842.17
A constitutional question is also raised. The majority opinion takes the
position that the use of the "general law" doctrine of Swift v. Tyson to pre-
vent the application of state law was a violation of the powers reserved to
the states in the Tenth Amendment.1 8 In a concurring opinion Justice Reed
said that having construed the statute and found that the previous interpreta-
tion was erroneous it was unnecessary to go further and hold that the previous
interpretation was unconstitutional.' 9 He thought the Constitution ambiguous
on the point and that the ambiguity had induced the first Congress to enact
the statute. He said that, in the absence of statute, federal courts may have
the power to do justice without being bound by state law in diversity of
citizenship cases 20 and that Article III and the "necessary and proper" clause
of Article I, Section 8, might even authorize Congress to fix the substantive
law to be applied in these cases. Justice Butler thought that the constitutional
'Varren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 (1923) 37
HAuv. L. REv. 49, 87.
"58 Sup. Ct. 817, 823 (1938).
""Evidently Congress has intended throughout the years that the rule of decision as
construed should continue to govern federal courts in trials at common law." 58 Sup.
Ct 817, 826 (1938).
'858 Sup. Ct. 817, 822-823 (1938).
"58 Sup. Ct. 817, 828 (1938).
t'Art. III, Sec. 2: "The judicial power shall extend ... to controversies ... between
citizens of different states . " Judicial power may include power to determine the
common law.
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question was not properly before the Court because no litigant had raised
the question and because the statute requiring the Court to certify constitu-
tional questions before it to the Attorney General so that the United States
could intervene in support of the constitutionality of the Act involved had
not been complied with.
21
INTERPRETATION
Is Justice Butler's canon of interpretation sound? What people subse-
quently understand by ambiguous language in a statute, especially govern-
ment officials called upon to apply .or amend it, throws' some light on its
meaning because the meaning of all words is to a large extent that which
.they have acquired by customary usage.2 2 But the fact that Congress did
nothing about the Court's interpretation of the statute in Swift v. Tyson is
not evidence that they ever thought about the matter. If there was evidence
of such thought it would not outweigh the evidence of the purpose of the
Congress which enacted the statute as shown by the original draft of the
section. 23 If an ambiguity exists, the purpose of the enacting body must
prevail over subsequent practical interpretations made in the absence of
evidence of that purpose. Furthermore, if the silence of Congress from 1842
to the present was a practical construction of the statute in accordance with
the interpretation in Swift v. Tyson, its silence from 1797 to 1842 when the
Supreme Court was construing the statute in the way which the majority
has now construed it24 in Erie Railroad Coinpany v. Tompkins was a prac-
tical construction. One construction would tend to neutralize the persuasive
force of the other as evidence.
Of course, Congressional silence does not amount to an enactment of the
interpretation in Swift v. Tyson. It merely indicated that there was no group
interested and powerful enough to attract the attention of Congress from
more pressing problems.
The only objection which can be offered to the majority's interpretation
is that there is no evidence that either the senators or representatives ever
saw the original draft of Section 34. It was offered as an amendment to
258 Sup. Ct. 817, 827 (1938).
2
'A Brief History of the English Language, by James Hadley, revised by George Ly-
man Kittredge in Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d ed.
"Roche v. Jordan, 175 Fed. 234 (C. C. E. D. N. Y. 1919) ; Frey v. Michie, 68 Mich.
323, 36 N. W. 184 (1888); Deutchman v. The Town of Charlestown, et al., 40 Ind.
449 (1872) ; Smith v. Town of Westerly, 19 R. I. 437, 35 Atl. 526 (1896) ; Slutts' v.
Dana, 138 Ia. 244, 115 N. W. 1115 (1908); State v. Lancashire Fire Insurance Co.,
66 Ark. 466, 51 S. W. 633 (1899) ; SEDGWlCK, STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d
ed. 1874)' 214; BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS (2d ed.
1911) 95.
2Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 (1923)
37 HARv. L. REv. 49, 88; Meigs, Decisions of the Federal Courts on Questions of State
Law (1882) 8 So. L. REv. (N. s.) 452, 458, 45 AMR. L. REv. 47, 55.
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the first draft of the Judiciary Act when the bill initiated by its committee
was being considered by the Senate. Warren says that the wording of the
amendment was changed by Ellsworth before it was introduced but does
not give the evidence from which he draws this conclusion.2 5 It is just as
probable that the change was suggested by some other member of the Senate
after the original draft had been read to the Senate sitting as a committee
of the whole, and that the change was accepted by Ellsworth and then made
on the document.
One view is that committee reports and the speeches of committee mem-
bers explaining and supporting the bill, like the speeches of ordinary members,
are not evidence of the purpose of the enacting body.2 6 This is because they
only tend to showv the purpose of one house and not that of the other house
nor of the executive,27 just as the speeches of individual members only tend
to show the purpose of that member. A realistic appreciation of the legis-
lative process has made it clear that the use of this material is about the
only way in which the collective intention of the legislative body can be as-
certained.28 If the meaning of the language is clear, the collective purpose
can be derived from it. The inference is that the legislative body meant
what it said. Where, however, there are ambiguities in the language the best
that can be done is to infer that its purpose was the purpose of the commit-
tee in charge.
Similarly, where there is an ambiguity in a section added to a statute by
amendment of the original draft, the purpose of the legislative body must be
taken to be the purpose of the nember offering the amendment? This will
be so whether or not that purpose was communicated to the legislative body
in a report or by speeches.80 The reports of a committee of one house and
the speeches of committee members or of a member introducing an amend-
ment are not necessarily communicated to the members of the other house
or to the executive. The only possible inference is that the body or the execu-
tive approving without information as to the purpose behind ambiguous
language intended to adopt the purpose of those responsible for the language
regardless of what it was.
In this case, not only was Oliver Ellsworth, in whose handwriting the
original draft and alteration is, the member responsible for the amendment,
'Wrarren, supra note 24, at 86.
'Davies, The Interpretation of Statutes in the Light of Their Policy by the English
Courts (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 519, 531.
'Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2332 (1769).
'Landis, A Note on "Statetory Interpretation" (1930) 43 HAav. L. REv. 886; Cham-
berlain, The Courts and Committee Reports (1933) 1 U. OF CHI. L. Rav. 81.
2*United States v. St. Paul, M. and M. R. Co., 247 U. S. 310 (1918); Chamberlain,
supra note 28, at 82 and 85.
*"A mere expression of assent becomes in reality a concurrence in the expressed views
of another." Landis, supra note 28, at 889.
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but he was also chairman of the committee of ten senators appointed by the
Senate to draft the bill. Although there is no evidence that the senators saw
the original draft, it is probable that they did. There were only twenty men
in the Senate and the creation of a federal judicial system was the first and
most important matter to come before them. In all probability the original
draft with the crossed out portions clearly legible was handed about. That it
was available for inspection is a fair inference from the fact that it was
found in the Senate files.
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
It would seem that there was no constitutional question before the court.
It was not suggested that the construction of the phrase "laws of the several
states" to include the decisions of state courts violated any provision of the
Constitution. Justice Brandeis apparently felt that something was needed
besides a showing that the previous interpretation was erroneous in order
,to change a construction adhered to for nearly a century. Why should not
error be corrected when discovered no matter how long it has been adhered
to? It does not appear that either party had changed his position relying
upon the previous construction. The change does not involve any unfairness
to the parties. Justice Brandeis unwittingly assumes that the previous de-
cisions are "law" which the court cannot change unless it violates the Con-
stitution. He assumes that unless the "law" is unconstitutional, change is
the province of Congress even though the "law" involved was made by the
Court. If the previous decisions or the rule announced in them is "law",
it would seem that the Court could undo what it has done, could change
what it has made. If it could go ahead in the cases which established the
old construction without waiting for an authoritative interpretation from
Congress, it can apply a different rule as soon as it has determined that
the original construction was erroneous, without waiting for an Act of Con-
gress. We have the authority of the Supreme Court itself for this.81
-'Benson v. United States, 146 U. S. 325 (1892) ; Rosen v. United States, 245 U. S.
467 (1918) ; Funk v. United States, 290 U. S. 371 (1933). In Funk v. United States,
Justice Sutherland said, "It may be said that the court should continue to enforce the
old rule however contrary to modern experience and thought, and however opposed, in
principle, to the general current of legislation and of judicial opinion it may have be-
come, leaving to Congress the responsibility of changing it. Of course, Congress las
that power; but if Congress fail to act, as it has failed in respect of the matter now
under review, and the court be called upon to decide the question, is it not the duty-of
the court, if it possess the power, to decide it in accordance with present day standards
of wisdom and justice rather than in accordance with some outworn and antiquated rle
of the past? That this court has the power to do so is necessarily implicit in the opinions
delivered in deciding the Benson and Rosen cases. And that implication, we think, rests
upon substantial ground." (pp. 381-2). "To concede this capacity for growth and change
in the common law by drawing 'its inspiration from every fountain of justice', and at
the same time to say that the courts of this country are forever bound to perpetuate
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If the constitutional question should arise how should it be decided? Jus-
tice Brandeis said that no clause in the Constitution conferred on either Con-
gress or the federal courts the power to fix the rules of substantive law for
cases arising under the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. This is a con-
clusion, for it is a question whether or not the power is conferred by Sec-
tion 2 of Article III and the "necessary and proper" clause of Article I,
Section 8. Article III, Section 2 provides:
"The judicial power shall extend . . . to controversies . . . between
citizens of different states . ... "
What is judicial power? Is it merely power to try the enumerated classes
of cases or does it also include power to decide what the substantive law is
which is to be applied? State courts determine what the law is in adjudicating
controversies to which statutes do not apply. The judicial power conferred
on the Federal Government must include this power.31' However, it does not
follow that the law thus ascertained would be federal law. What kind of
law did those who framed Article III intend that the federal courts should
determine? Was it their purpose to confer power to decide what national
law is in the enumerated fields or was it merely to confer jurisdiction to ad-
judicate cases involving the enumerated subject matters, the law incidentally
determined to be state law?
An examination of the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention reveals
that the words "The judicial power" were substituted for the words "The
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court" with which the Section began when
it was reported to the Convention by the committee of detail.82 By Section
1 of Article III the judicial power was vested in "one Supreme Court and
such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and estab-
lish". It would seem that the purpose of the change was to make it clear
that jurisdiction over the enumerated subject matters was conferred not
only on the Supreme Court but also on such inferior courts as Congress
should establish. It would seem that no change in meaning was intended by
the change from the word "jurisdiction" to the words "judicial power", the
latter being used merely because they already appeared in Section 1. Appar-
ently the meaning is the same as though the section read: "The jurisdiction
such of its rules as, by every reasonable test, are found to be neither wise nor just,
because we have once adopted them as suited to our situation and institutions at a par-
ticular time, is to deny to the common law in the place of its adoption a 'flexibility and
capacity for growth and adaptation' which was 'the peculiar boast and excellence' "of
the system in the place of its origin." (p. 383).
'Powell, loc. cit. supra note 1.
12 FARRAND, THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL. CONVENTION (1911) 425, 431; 5 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1881) 483. The wording as reported
by the committee of detail may be found in 2 FARRAND, THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION (1911) 186. See Powell, loc. cit. supra note 1.
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of the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as the Congress shall estab-
lish shall extend to . . . " etc. The conclusion to be drawn from the pro-
ceedings of the Convention is that the purpose of the framers of Article III,
Section 2 was merely to confer jurisdiction to adjudicate cases involving the
enumerated subject matters and not to confer power to* determine national
law on these matters.
However, the Supreme Court, by a vote of five to four in Southern Pacific
Co. v. Jensen,33 reached the opposite conclusion. It held that the legislature
of New York could not make its workmen's compensation act applicable
to injuries received by men employed in unloading vessels although there
was no federal statute applicable to the case. Justice McReynolds said that
the judicial power conferred on the United States by Section 2 of Article III
conveyed power to apply "national law". In the absence of statute, national
law was "general maritime law as accepted by the federal courts". Some state
legislation was permissible but not any which "interferes with the proper
harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate rela-
tions". The New York statute "destroyed" uniformity, "hampered and im-
peded" navigation, and injured commerce. Thus an important factor in the
decision was the idea that the statute imposed a burden on interstate and
foreign commerce, a question which should have received separate considera-
tion. A factor which influenced the decision was a statute which conferred on
the District Courts of the United States "exclusive original cognizance of all
civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ... saving to suitors, in
all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is com-
petent to give it".
Justice Pitney, dissenting, said that:
(1) "The framers of the Constitution intended to establish jurisdiction
-the power to hear and determine controversies of the various
classes specified-and not to prescribe particular codes or systen,5-
of law for the decision of those controversies; ......
(2) At the time the Constitution was adopted the jurisdiction of ad-
miralty courts was not exclusive, and the common law courts had
concurrent jurisdiction in a large class of matters.
(3) Admiralty courts then applied local law, including statutes.3 4
Justice Holmes dissented, saying that there was no common law of the
United States; that "The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in
the sky, but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that
can be identified; .... It always is the law of some state." Justice Brandeis
"3244 U. S. 205 (1917).
"Admiralty courts in adjudicating transitory causes of action arising in foreign terri-
torial waters apply foreign law. STIMSON, CONFLICT OF CRImINAL LAWS (1936) 146-147,
and cases there cited.
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joined in the dissent, continued to dissent in subsequent cases in which the
decision was followed, 85 and from his dictum in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomp-
kins it is plain that he is of the same opinion still. Justice McReynolds'
dogmatic assertion that the judicial power conferred by Article III, Section
2 included power to apply national law, his confusion of the issue with the
question whether interstate or foreign commerce were burdened, and the
arbitrary character of the decisions sustaining the application of local law
on the ground that in the particular case it did not interfere with "the proper
harmony and uniformity" of the "general", "national" maritime law "in its
international and interstate relations",3 6 indicates that now the Jensen case
is more likely to be overruled than it is to offer an obstacle to the contrary
conclusion suggested by the records of the Convention.
In a dictum in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, Justice McReynolds said
that the "necessary and proper" clause of Article I, Section 8, gave Congress
power to legislate on admiralty and maritime matters. Justice Reed suggested
in his concurring opinion in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins that power may
have been conferred on Congress by this clause. It is as follows:
"The Congress shall have power. . . . To make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers
[those specifically conferred on Congress] and all other powers vested
by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any
department or officer thereof. '37
The dictum seems unwarranted because:
(1) The clause seems only to enable Congress to make laws for carry-
ing into execution the powers conferred on other departments of
the government and not to authorize them to exercise those powers.
(2) The Convention refused to amend Section 2 of Article III by
inserting after the sentence fixing the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court the words:
"In all the other cases mentioned the judicial power shall be
exercised in such manner as the legislature shall direct."3 8
'Chelentis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 247 U. S. 372 (1918) ; Union Fish Co. v. Erickson,
248 U. S. 308 (1919) ; Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S. 149 (1919) ; State
of Washington v. W. C. Dawson and Co., 264 U. S. 219 (1923); London Guaraniee
and Accident Co. Ltd. v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, 279 U. S. 108
(1929) ; Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U. S. 222 (1930) ; Employer's Liability Assur-
ance Corp. Ltd. v. Cook, 281 U. S. 233 (1930). Except in Union Fish Co. v. Erickson,
supra.
'Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233 (1921); Giant Smith-Porter Ship Co.
v. Rohde, 257 U. S. 469 (1922) ; Millers' Indemnity Underwriters v. Brand, 270 U. S.
59 (1926); Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission of California,
276 U. S. 467 (1928); Sultan Railway and Timber Co. v. Department of Labor aad
Industries of Washington, 277 U. S. 135 (1928). For example, a state. workmeh's
compensation act was held to interfere with the uniformity of national maritime law in
the Jensen case while a state wrongful death statute was held not to in Western Fuel
Co. v. Garcia, supra.
'Italics the writer's.
"2 FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 425, 431; 5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES
ON THE FEDERAL CONSTnrUTION (2d ed. 1881) 483.
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This would seem to indicate that the Convention did not intend
that this section should confer power on Congress to make the
substantive law in the classes of cases in which judicial power
was given to the federal government.
THE PROBLEM
The real problem involved in SOift v. Tyson and Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, a problem left unsolved by the opinion in the latter, is the ques-
tion of what the law of a state is when the decisions of its courts are con-
flicting. Similar problems were involved in most of the cases in which the
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson was applied. What is the law of a state when
its courts have never passed on the issue? -What is it when the latest decision
is very old and the whole course of decision has changed since that day, or
when it is recent but obviously unjust so that the state court itself might
be expected to overrule its previous decision? If the applicable law has been
changed since the occurrence of the event the legal effect of which is in
question, by a reversal of previous decisions, as of what time should the
federal courts ascertain it? 9 These problems confront not only the federal
courts but also any court; that is, whether the law to be applied is that of
another state or its own.40 They are aspects of the question: What is law?
NATURE OF LAW
Without attempting to examine the nature of law in all of its aspects, it
will help in the solution of the questions raised abo e if two different mean-
ings of the term "law' . which are well recognized are kept in mind.4' It may
be used in the sense of principle, rule, or hypothesis of right or justice, just
as a law of physics is a principle of truth.4 2 While some of these principles
'See Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1336, 1350.
Story's dictum may have been due to his nationalism as suggested by Waterman, The
Nationalism of Swift v. Tyson (1933) 11 N. C. L. REV. 125; but the problem in that
case and in practically all of the cases in which the "general law" doctrine has been
applied is the problem of what the law of a state is under peculiar conditions of the
case law such as those stated. Shelton in his article completely ignores the problem,
assuming that the decisions of (state) courts are law. Shelton, Concurrent Jurisdiction
-Its Necessity and Its Dangers (1928) 15 VA. L. Rav. 137, 144.
°Stimson, Which Law Should Governf (1938) 24 VA. L. REv. 748, 756 n. 27.
*'Pound, Theories of Law (1912) 22 YALE L. J. 114; More About the Nature of Law,
LEGAL ESSAYS IN TRIBUTE TO ORRIN KIP MCMURRAY (1935) 513; Green, The Law as
Precedent, Prophecy, and Principle: State Decisions in Federal Courts (1924) 19 ILL.
L REv. 217.
"Green, supra note 41. Schofield, Swift v,. Tyson: Uniformity of Judge-Made State Law
in State and Federal Courts (1910) 4 ILL. L. REv. 533.
Professor Gray attempted to reduce the view that law preexists, is found by the courts,
and is not their decisions (i.e., that non-statutory law is a principle of truth, right or
justice) to an absurdity by asking, "Vhat is the law in the time of Richard Coeur de
Lion on the liability of a telegraph company to the persons to whom a message was
sent?" GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAw (1909) § 222. While it is true
that the question of the liability of a telegraph company for its failure to deliver a
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may vary with local custom, many are universally or generally true in the
sense that justice would require the same solution to the problem anywhere.
Law as a principle of right or justice may be universal or general. The term
law may also be used to mean the principles, rules, or hypotheses which the
courts will enforce. These would be difficiilt to predict without inferences
from decisions or rules announced in the past by authoritative agencies of the
state whose law is applicable. Authoritatively announced rules are territorial
and local since the authority of a state's agency does not extend beyond the
territory controlled by it.
Authoritatively announced rules are not the sole basis of decisions and
therefore not the sole basis for predicting the future action of courts. When
statutes are applicable courts must apply them regardless of the justice of
the result (that being the responsibility of the legislature); but in 'cases
where statutes do not apply, the function of a court is to do justice between
the parties if practicable. The rules announced in previous decisions are
persuasive only and will be changed and the decisions overruled if they pro-
duce injustice. They are constantly subject to critical comparison with prin-
ciples of justice and give way before them.
Not all of the finer principles of ethics or good conduct can be enforced.
Absolute justice is impracticable. Time, expense and inconvenience would
be too great a price to pay for the minor good secured. There is an area
within which public opinion will not consent to regulation and conduct
must be left uncontrolled except for the moral restraint which individuals
impose of themselves."
GENERAL LAW
Who was right, Story or H6lmes? Is there a general law or is there no
such "brooding omnipresence in the sky". Does this not depend upon the
aspect of law which you have in mind? If one has in mind authoritatively
announced rules, then there is no general law; for each pronouncement is
authoritative in a certain area only. It is territorial and local. If one has in
mind principles or rules of justice, then while some may vary with local
custom, many will be general in the sense that everywhere the application of
the same principle will b e essential to a just solution of the problem. Thus
both Story and Holmes were right. More specifically each was right in the
case in which he expressed his view. In Swift v. Tyson where there were
conflicting state court decisions, Story was right in resorting to a general
message correctly could not have come before the courts in the time of Richard Coeur
de Lion, had a court of that day had the problem it would have endeavored to render
a just decision and the principle of truth, right or justice would be the same then as it
is now. Professor Gray's reducto ad absurdum assumes that truth does not exist unless
it is written.
"PouND, LAW AND MoRALs (2d ed. 1926) 63-64.
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principle or rule of justice as evidenced by the weight of authority elsewhere.
In Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, Justice Holmes was right in pointing out
that the authoritative aspect of law could not be ignored; that since there
was no national common law the authoritative New York workmen's com-
pensation act could not be set aside in favor of any general principle derived
from common law.
CUSTOMARY LAW
Much law is customary and formal. A formal ceremony which is customary
induces parties to think twice before taking an important step, fixes the
transaction in their memories, establishes it in point of time and gives it
publicity or objectivity which makes subsequent successful denial of the
occurrence difficult. It does not make much difference what the formality
is. All that is essential is that it be understood in the locality where it is
employed. Customary or formal law is frequently different in different
states and countries. That which prevails in one is neither more nor less
just than that which prevails in another. It is not general law because ap-
plication of the same rule is not everywhere necessary to a just solution of
the problem. Since the state court's duty to do justice will not require it to
overrule its previous decisions of this type, Story was right in recognizing
that the authoritatively announced local rules must be applied. This applies
to such real property rules as are customary and formal.
EFFECT OF THE DECISION
TYPES OF CASES IN WHICH THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AND THE RESULT WILL
BE THE SAME
1. CONFLICTING DECISIONS
If the problem is one upon which the decisions of the highest court of
the state whose law is applicable are conflicting and the inconsistent earlier
decisions have not been specifically overruled, what is the state law which the
federal court must apply? In Swift v. Tyson, the New York Court of Errors
had never passed on the question; but, according to Story, the New York
Supreme Court had three times decided it one way and three times the
other. In Folsom v. Ninety Six,44 two absolutely inconsistent decisions of
the state supreme court had been handed down between the time when the
cause of action arose and the time when it came before the federal court.
The Supreme Court said: "There not being shown to have been a single
decision of the state court against the constitutionality of the act of 1885
before the plaintiff purchased his bonds, nor any settled course of decision
upon the subject, even since his purchase, the question of the validity of these
"1159 U. S. 611 (1895).
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bonds must be determined by this court according to its own view of the law
of South Carolina." 441 On the other hand, in Townsend v. Todd,45 where
the decisions of the state supreme court were conflicting, the United States
Supreme Court followed the last state court decision without attempting to
exercise its own independent judgment.
Folsom v. Ninety Six involved the interpretation of the state constitution;
and Townsend v. Todd, the construction of a statute. Although Story said
that the term "laws" in Section 34 of the Judiciary Act was to be understood
as meaning "statutes" and "the construction thereof adopted by the local
tribunals", 46 the problem presented by conflicting decisions is the same
whether they involve the interpretation of a statute, the construction of the
state constitution, or a question of "common law". 47 The course pursued in
Folsom v. Ninety Six and Swift v. Tyson is preferable to that pursued in
Townsend v. Todd. The federal courts must continue to pursue it. They
must proceed in the same way that the state court would proceed. 48 That
court would not be bound to follow the last decision. It would reexamine
the question and attempt to reach the best solution. In cases like Folsom v.
Nin-ety Six, the federal courts will make their own effort to ascertain the
purpose of the state constitutional convention. In cases like Townsend v.
Todd, they will endeavor to ascertain independently the object of the legis-
lature.49 In cases like Swift v. Tyson, they will exercise their own indepen-
dent judgment in seeking a just solution. They will seek to find a principle
of justice. In doing so all pertinent knowledge will be employed, including the
truths of the social sciences and the solutions arrived at by courts in other'
jurisdictions. In this type of case the result can be said to follow from an
application of general law, for the law of the state is a principle which would
be required anywhere to secure a just solution of the problem.
2. NO DECISIONS
If the courts of the state whose law is applicable have never passed on the
problem, what is the law which the federal court must apply? Is there any
law? The federal court must do what it thinks a court of the state whose
law is applicable would do, but that court would have the same problem.
Should it impose and enforce a duty when there has been no prior announce-
ment of it by an authoritative agency of the state? Whether non-statutory
"-159 U. S. 611, 627 (1895).
491 U. S. 452 (1875).
'See the analysis of Swift v. Tyson. supra pp. 54-56.
'See Rand, Swift v. Tyson versus Gelpcke v. Dubuque (1895) 8 HARv. L. REv. 328,
338.
"See Green, The Law as Precedent, Prophecy, and Principle: State Decisions in
Federal Courts (1924) 19 ILL. L. Rv. 217, 221-224.
"See notes 51, 52, and 53 post.
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law is a principle which the courts will enforce or a principle of justice prac-
tically enforcible, authoritative announcement is not essential to it. If there
is no decision of a court of the state whose law is applicable, it is more
difficult to predict and so more difficult for a federal court to do what the
state court would do. There are, however, other means of prediction. The
decisions of courts in other jurisdictions are useful although not authoritative.
Other learning may be pertinent. In the absence of decisions elsewhere a
state court would endeavor as best it could to reach a just result. That courts
do this is well known. The fact that a case is one of first impression either
in the state or in the world will not prevent them from imposing and en-
forcing a duty which is just and practically enforcible.
The objection has ,been made that in doing this courts are legislating or
making law and applying it retroactively. Whether this objection has any
validity depends upon (1) whether courts make law, and (2) whether if
they do there is any injustice in applying it retroactively. It would. seem that
in deciding these cases courts merely ascertain and apply custom or' a princi-
ple of justice practically enforcible. It would seem that the custom or prac-
tically enforcible principle of justice was the law rather than the decision.
However, since decisions are the principal means of predicting what courts
will do in future decisions and are relied upon by the public, they are law
in the sense that persons who change their position in reliance upon the rules
announced in them will have those rules applied to their conduct even though
it is subsequently determined that they were erroneous. 0 In this sense, then,
the courts can be said to make law or legislate. If they do, the law made
is applied to determine the legal effect of conduct or an event which occurred
at a time prior to the decision-a retroactive application. There seems to be
no injustice in this for two reasons. (1) Only the authoritative aspect of
the rule is new, the custom or principle of justice being in existence or
ascertainable at the time of the conduct or event the legal effect of which
was determined. (2) The parties have not been misled because they were
not justified in relying on any other course. It is preferable to require them
to expect law in the sense of custom or justice to be applied than to leave
them free to assume that there is no law on the question.
There are a number of decisions in cases of this class by the Supreme
Court of the United States. They all involve the interpretation of state
statutes. In two, Swift v. Tyson is referred to in the opinion.
In Burgess v. Selignuzn,51 the federal district court was called upon to
determine whether a Missouri statute exempting the pledgees of corporate
stock from the personal liability of stockholders applied to one who received
'See § 3, b, "Erroneous Decisions-Relied Upon," post.
'107 U. S. 20 (1882).
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stock as a pledge from the issuing corporation. It held that the statute
applied. Subsequently the Supreme Court of Missouri in two decisions
reached the opposite conclusion. The United States Supreme Court held
that it was not obliged to follow the state decisions because the duty of the
federal courts was "to exercise an independent judgment in cases not fore-
closed by previous adjudication".
In Burns Mortgage Co. v. Fried,52 the question was whether a stipulation
in a note made it non-negotiable. The stipulation was for interest at a
specified rate until paid and at a higher rate on deferred interest payments.
The applicable law was that of Florida. The Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Law adopted in that state provided that for an instrument to be
negotiable the promise or order must be to pay a "sum certain in money"
and that a sum is certain "although it is to be paid with interest". There
were no decisions in Florida construing the statute. In the opinion Justice
Roberts said:
"The absence of a decision by the Supreme Court of the state did not
relieve the courts below from applying the Florida statute. Lacking
such authoritative construction, their duty was to determine the question
according to the accepted canons and in the light of the decisions of the
courts of other states with respect to the same sections of the Negotiable
Instruments Law."
Applying the decisions of courts of other states just as Story did in Swift v.
Tyson, the Court held the note negotiable, denying at the same time that
the general law doctrine could be applied to the construction of statutes
codifying the common law.
The method employed in the two decisions above is employed in the
others. 53 The same judicial process would seem to be required when statutes
are not involved.
3. ERRONEOUS DECISIONS
If the problem is one upon which the decisions of the courts of the state
whose law is applicable are erroneous, what is the state law which the federal
court must apply? Are the rules announced in these decisions law which the
court must apply? If the rules applied in previous decisions are law, courts
would be bound to apply them until they were changed by the legislature.
They could not repudiate the rule, overrule the decisions and apply a different
-292 U. S. 487 (1934).
'Siler v. Louisville and Nashville R. R. Co., 213 U. S. 175 (1909) ; Risty v. Chicago
R. I. and Pac. Ry. Co., 270 U. S. 378 (1926); Railroad Comm. of California v. Los
Angeles Railway Corp., 280 U. S. 145 (1929). See Fordham, Swift v. Tyson and the
Construction of State Statutes (1935) 41 W. VA. L. Q. 131; The Federal Courts and
the Construction of Uniform State Laws (1929) 7 N. CAP. L. Rv. 423; and McCormick
and Hewins, The Collapse of "General" Law in the Federal Courts (1938) 33 ILL. L.
REv. 126, 136.
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rule. If the rules applied in previous decisions are not law, they can never
be relied upon. Persons who change their position relying upon them would
be unfairly or unjustly treated if a different rule were applied. A loss would
be caused them by changing the rule after they bad altered their position
relying on the previous rule.54 In this dilemma it would seem well to treat
cases in which a party had changed his position relying on the previous rule
differently from those in which there had been no such change or reliance
That is what the courts do.
a. Not relied upon
When the rule announced in previous decisions has not in fact been relied
upon, courts generally will repudiate the rule, overrule the decisions and
apply a new rule to the prior conduct or prior event when convinced that
the old rule is erroneous or produces injustice. They do so whether the de-
cisions are old or recent, many or few, although more hesitant about repudi-
ating a rule recently or repeatedly followed than one announced in one or
two old cases. It would seem, therefore, that law is not a rule applied in
previous decisions but a practically enforcible principle of justice or the
purpose of the legislature or constitutional convention and a forecast of
what courts will do in the future. There are, of course, some melancholy
instances where courts have sorrowfully applied the rule of previous decisions
although convinced that it was erroneous or would produce injustice.5 5 They
have looked upon rules applied in previous decisions as law which must
be applied until changed by the legislature 6 although those rules were estab-
lished in cases where they were attempting either to do justice in the absence
of legislation or to ascertain correctly the purpose of the legislature or con-
stitutional convention. Neither party having relied upon it, previous error
ought not prevent a just or correct decision.
Is the course generally followed objectionable because the newly discovered
rule is applied to prior conduct or a prior event? It would seem not to be
for two reasons. (1) The application of the new rule is retroactive only
in it5 authoritative aspect since the principle of right or justice or the purpose
of the legislature or constitutional convention was ascertainable at the ti!me
of the conduct or event to which it is applied. (2) The parties have not been
"See supra p. 68.
5'See, for example, Ex parte Carey, 306 Mo. 287 (1924). In this case a statute pro-
vided that in case of an appeal from a criminal conviction a judge "may" let the
defendant to bail. In several earlier cases the Supreme Court of Missouri had held
that this entitled the convicted man to be released on bail as a matter of right. In this
case Ragland, J., stated that these previous cases were obviously wrong but that "the
remedy lies with the legislature rather than with this court".
'This view is taken by Charles N. Campbell. Campbell, Is Swift v. Tyson anArguneot Fo or Against Abolishing Diversity of Citizenship .urisdiction. (1932) 18
A. B. A. J. 809, 810, discussing Cole v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 43 F. (2d) 953
(C. C. A. 2d 1930).
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misled. Not knowing the decisions they should have expected that the courts
would do justice or interpret statute or constitution correctly.57
May an inferior court refuse to apply a rule, applied in the decisions of
the highest court of the state whose law is applicable, .which it believes is
erroneous or unjust, or must it obey? Some have thought that an inferior
court must obey.58 It is submitted that it has no such duty. Its duty is to
apply constitution and statute as the constitutional convention and legislature
intended them to be applied, and in cases where constitution or statutes do
not apply, to do justice between the parties. If it is. convinced that the rule
applied in the decisions of the highest court of the state whose law is applica-
ble is wrong, it should not apply it. It should anticipate the overruling of
these decisions. By doing so it is less likely to be reversed. By correctly fore-
casting what the highest court of the state will do, it will save the parties
time and expense in case of an appeal and hasten the adaptation of the law
to changing conditions.
It would seem that a federal court in diversity of citizenship cases should
do what a court of the state whose law is applicable would do. If a party's
case is tried in a court of the state whose law is applicable, he would have an
opportunity to argue that an unfavorable rule previously followed was
erroneous or productive of injustice. If successful in persuading the court,
the rule would not be followed when neither party had relied upon it. In
a federal court he should have the same opportunity. Otherwise he will
be denied a right which he would have had in a court of the state whose law
is applicable.59
"CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) (Lecture IV, Adherence
to Precedent) 142, 146. At p. 128 he says: "Obscurity of statute or of precedent or
of custom or of morals, or collision between some or all of them, may leave the law
unsettled, and cast a duty upon the courts to declare it retrospectively in the exercise
of a power frankly legislative in function." Italics the writer's.
'Justice Miller dissenting in Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 208 (U. S.
1863); GRAY, NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAw (1909) §§ 541, 542.
'See Shulman, The Demise of Swift v. Tyson (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1336, 1350, where
he says: "Does this carry the power to disregard a state decision on the ground that
it will doubtless be overruled by the state court at the first opportunity?" and McCormick
and Hewins, The Collapse of "General" Law in the Federal Courts (1938) 38 ILL. 'L.
REV. 126, 136, where they say: "A Federal District Court, or even the Circuit Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court, will endeavor to rule as it believes the state supreme
court would now rule, as evidenced by its past decisions or considered dicta, and not
as it believes that court should do, unless some patent mistake in a past decision, or
some radical change of conditions, gives realistic grounds for believing that the past
decision would not be adhered to."
Prof. Frankfurter in emphasizing the desirability of uniformity of decision in causes
arising within a state overlooks the fact that if justice is to be done rules of law
springing from erroneous decisions must be corrected in the first case in which the
question arises. If law is to advance and the rules to be improved there must be pioneer
decisions. For a time these decisions will diverge from the weight of authority but if
they are just they will be followed and the old erroneous rule be abandoned. See
HOLMAfES, TnE CoMmoN LAw (1881) 35-36; Yntema, The Jurisdiction of the Federal
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In Railroad Co. v. Lockwood,8 0 the owner of cattle shipped from Buffalo
to Albany was riding with then when injured. He was riding on a pass
received as a part of the contract of carriage which contained a clause ex-
empting the railroad from liability for personal injuries caused by the com-
pany's negligence. The applicable law was that of New York. Its courts
had held the limitation of liability valid. The United States Supreme Court
sustained the district court in its refusal to follow these cases.
In Bucher v. Cheshire Railroad Ca., 61 a passenger on a railroad in Massa-
chusetts was. injured while traveling on Sunday. A Massachusetts statute
provided that, "Whoever travels on the Lord's Day, except for necessity or
charity, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding ten dollars." The Supreme
Court of Massachusetts, in a long line of decisions, had held that violation of
the statute barred recovery though the injury was due to negligence attribu-
table to the railroad. A statute, enacted after plaintiff was injured, intended
to reverse the rule established in these cases was held inapplicable to prior
conduct. The United States Supreme Court sustained the district court
which followed the state court decisions. It said the question was one of
local law.
In each case the district court could have found that the application of
the rule of the state decisions would produce such injustice that the high
court of the state would itself refuse to follow its previous decisions if the
case were before it. Is not the course pursued in Railroad Co. v. Lockwood
preferable to that followed in Bucher v. Cheshire Railroad Co.?
In Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co. v. Baugh,6 2 a fireman sued his railroad
company employer for damages for personal injury caused by the negligence
of the engineer with whom he worked. The applicable law was that of
Ohio. The supreme court of that state in several like cases forty years or more
old had permitted recovery. In most of the decisions in other states recovery
was denied on the ground that the engimeer was a fellow servant. The United
Courts in Controversies Between Citizens of Different States (1933) 19 A. B. A. J.
71, 74. Federal courts applying state law must do their part.
Prof. Frankfurter points out that the rule of Swift v. Tyson was not followed in
New York; that subsequently the contrary was decided in Stalker v. McDonald, 6 Hill
93 (N. Y. 1843), but he fails to note that Stalker v. McDonald was superseded by
Section 25 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act adopted by the legislature-of
New York (Consol. Laws, c. 39, § 51) so that the federal rule eventually prevailed in
New York. Kelso v. Ellis,,224 N. Y. 528, 121 N. E. 364 (1918). It is submitted that
it was the just rule. See Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United
States and State Courts (1928) 13 CORNELL L. Q. 499, 528-529.
'17 Wall. 357 (U. S. 1873). Accord: Liverpool and Great Western Steam Co. v.
Phenix Insurance Co., 129 U. S. 397 (1888). See also Lane v. Vick, 3 How. 476
(U. S. 1845); Russell v. Southard, 12 How. 139 (U. S. 1851); Watson v. Tarpley,
18 How. 517 (U. S. 1855). With the last two cases, cf. Camden and Suburban Railway
Co. v. Stetson, 177 U. S. 172 (1900).
"125 U. S. 555 (1887).
-149 U. S. 368 (1893).
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States Supreme Court sustained the district court in its refusal to follow the
Ohio decisions. It thought that principles of right and justice embodied in
the "common law" required a different result. While it is difficult to agree
with the Supreme Court's idea of right and justice, it was right in seeking
to ascertain what justice was instead of blindly following the old Ohio de-
cisions. It erred in relying on the weight of authority as the sole evidence
of right and justice at a time when workmen's compensation laws had come
into existence in some states.
. Only if we assume that the rule applied in erroneous decisions of the
courts of the state whose law is applicable is the law of that state will Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins prevent the federal courts from employing the
method sustained in Railroad Co. v. Lockwood and Baltimore and Ohio Rail-
road Co. v. Baugh."
b. Relied upon
Although the rules applied in previous decisions are not law, they are the
principal evidence of what the practically enforcible hypotheses or principles
of truth, right and justice are which courts will enforce in the future. They
are the most reliable means of forecasting what courts will do in the future.
Persons who change their position in reliance upon them ought not suffer,
loss by reason of a change in the rules. So when a party has changed his
position in reliance on a rule applied in previous decisions, the courts will
apply that rule in adjudicating his case although they are convinced that it
is erroneous or that it would produce injustice if applied in cases where
neither party had parted with property or made commitments in reliance
upon it. When a party has changed his position in reliance on the erroneous
old rule, an ex post facto application of newly discovered truth would be un-
fair and unjust.6 4 Because of the difficulty of knowing what justice is, a
party who has relied upon the rule previously applied is favored over the
'It is submitted that the sound view is that expressed by Justice Matthews in a dictum
in Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 478 (1887). He said: "There is no common law
of the United States, in the sense of a national customary law, distinct from the common
law of England as adopted by the several states each for itself, applied as its local
law, and subject to such alteration as may be provided by its own statutes. Wheaton
v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591. A determination in a given case of what that law is may be
different in a court of the United States from that which prevails in the judicial tri-
bunals of a particular state. This arises from the circumstance that the courts of the
United States, in cases within their jurisdiction, where they are called upon to administer
the law of the state in which they sit or by which the transaction is governed, exercise
an independent though concurrent jurisdiction, and are required to ascertain and declare
the law according to their own judgment. This is illustrated by the case of Railroad
Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, where the common law prevailing in the state of NeV
York, in reference to the liability of common carriers for negligence, received a different
interpretation from that placed upon it by the judicial tribunals of the state; but the
law as applied was none the less the law of that state."
"CARDozo, THE NATuRn OF THE JUDIcrAL PRocEss (1921) 147, 151.
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party who relied upon justice or the correct principle when he could have
acquainted himself with the previously applied rule.
An example of this is Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. Martn.6 5
Suit was brought in a federal aistrict court in Mississippi to quiet title to
land there. Both petitioner and defendants relied upon patents issued by
Mississippi to those through whom they claimed by mesne conveyances. The
-patent to petitioner's predecessor was prior in time. In 1888 after both
patents had been issued, the Supreme Court of Mississippi had occasion to
consider the patent upon which petitioner relied in a case involving other
parcels. It held that the statute pursuant to which the patent was issued
requiring a bond to be filed by the patentee was not satisfied by one signed
by more than the requisite number of "good securities" but not signed by
the patentee and that the patent was void.66 In 1900 the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached a contrary conclusion. 67 In 1924 the
Supreme Court of Mississippi refused to reexamine the correctness of its
decision of 188868 on the ground that it had become a rule of property which
could not then be departed from.6 9 The federal district court did the same.
Judgment for defendants was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court.
It did so on the ground that the rule applied in the Mississippi decision of
1888 was a rule of property affecting title to real estate upon which the
federal courts follow the decisions of state courts. Although the dates of
the mesne conveyances are not given, the defendants must have acquired
their interests after 1888 as the case was not argued in the Supreme Court
until 1925.
The rule that rules of property will not be departed from and Story's
-exception to his general law doctrine for "rights and titles to things having
a permanent locality, sdch as the rights and titles to real estate, and other
-matter immovable and intraterritorial in their nature and character" are
merely ways of stating the principle. The reason for this refusal to correct
error is the fact of a change in position by one of the parties relying on the
rule announced in the previous erroneous decision.70 That the -principle is
not limited to real estate7 ' or "things having a permanent locality" is shown
-268 U. S. 458 (1925).
'Hardy v. Hartman, 65 Miss. 504 (1888).
'Southern Pine Co. v. Hall, 105 Fed. 84 (1900).
'
8Reaffirmed in Becker v. Columbia Bank, 112 Miss. 819 (1917).
'Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. State ex rel. Moore, 134 Miss. 533 (1924).
"'See Freeman, The Protection Afforded Against the Retroactive Operation of an
O0vermding Decision (1918) 18 CoL. L. REv. 230; Kocourek, Retrospective Decisions and
Stare Decisis and a Proposal (1931) 17 A. B. A. J. 180.
'Heiskell, Conflict between Federal and State Decisions (1882) 16 AMER. L. REv.
743, 759; Trickett, Non-Federal Law in Federal Courts (1906) 40 AMER. L. REv. 819, 823.
"I think it will be found that the high regard of courts for rules of property is in a
large part based upon their total want of power to make decisions operate other than
:prospectively." Heiskel1, loc. cit. supra.
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by Anderson 'v. Santa Ana 72 where the validity of the bonds of an Illinois
municipality was sustained by applying Illinois Supreme Court decisions
existing when the bonds were issued. Gelpcke v. Dubuque 3 and similar cases
subsequently considered illustrate the same principle.,
When courts apply a rule established in previous erroneous decisions al-
though convinced that it is wrong they should declare that it will not be
applied to subsequent conduct or events, thus giving fair warning and effec-
tively preventing future change of position in reliance on the old rule.74 This
should be done by federal courts in diversity cases as well as by state courts
since both independently declare the law of the state. There may be a tem-
porary divergence but truth will ultimately triumph.
4. DECISIONS SUBSEQUENT TO THE CONDUCT OR EVENT THE LEGAL
EFFECT OF WHICH IS IN QUESTION
What is the law of a state when the only decisions or the latest decisions
of its highest court on the point in issue were decided subsequent to the time
of the conduct or event the legal effect of which is in question? Must fed-
eral courts in diversity cases apply the rules of these decisions? If law is a
practically enforcible principle of truth, right or justice, the answer must
be no, for the federal courts employing their independent judgment are as
capable of ascertaining what truth, right or justice is as are the state courts.75
If law is a forecast of what the courts of the state whose law is applicable
will do, then subsequent decisions would seem to be some evidence of their
future conduct. However, if they are followed without question the court
would be abandoning its duty which in every case is to do justice or to apply
constitution or statute as the constitutional convention or legislature intended
it to be applied. It must exercise its independent judgment in doing so. If
it is convinced that the state decisions are erroneous or would produce in-
justice the only proper forecast is one which assumes that the state court
will ultimately correct its error and that truth, right and justice will prevail.
If law is the rule applied in previous decisions, then the rule applied in the
decisions being considered here was not law at all at the time of the conduct
or event the legal effect of which is in question.
In a great many cases the Supreme Court of the United States has held
that the district courts were not bound to apply decisions of the Supreme
-116 U. S. 356 (1886).
31 Wall. 175 (U. S. 1863), post note 81.7
'Supra note 70.
"Schofield, Swift v. Tyson: Uniformity of Judge-Made State Law in State and Federal
Courts (1910) 4 ILL. L. REv. 533; Green, The Law as Precedent, Prophecy, and Prin-
ciple: State Decisions in Federal Courts (1924) 19 ILL. L. REv. 217; Brown, Thfie
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts Based on Diversity of Citizenship (1929) 78 U. OF
PA. L. R~v. 179, 190.
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Court of the state whose law was applicable which were decided after the
conduct or event the legal effect of which was in question. In doing so they
apply the principle that the applicable law is the law to which persons or
property were subject at the time of the conduct or event the legal effect of
which is in question.7" Since the authoritative character of decisions subse-
quent does not extend back to that time, they are perceived to be no more
obligatory than the decisions of the courts of other states. The United States
Supreme Court decisions will now be considered.
a. No previous decisions
In Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co.,77 Kuhn had sold and conveyed the coal
under his land in West Virginia to Camden. The deed granted the right
to "mine, excavate and remove all of said coal". Camden conveyed to the
Fairmont Coal Co. which removed all of the coal, causing the surface to sub-
side. Kuhn sued in a federal court in West Virginia. Shortly after suit was
filed, the Supreme Court of West Virginia construing an identical deed held
that the grantee was not obliged to support the surface.78 There were no
earlier decisions. The Circuit Court of Appeals asked the United States
Supreme Court whether it was obliged to follow the West Virginia decision.
The Supreme Court said no. It told the inferior court to exercise its inde-
pendent judgment to determine what the rights and obligations of the parties
were under the deed. It did the same in many other cases.79 Only if it is
"". .where the. liability of a municipal corporation upon negotiable securities de-
pends upon a local statute, the rights of the parties are to be determined according
to the law as declared by the state courts at the time such securities were issued."
Anderson v. Santa Anna, 116 U. S. 356, 361 (1886). "But being long posterior to the
time when the securities were issued, they can have no effect upon our decision and
may be laid out of view. We can look only to the condition of things which subsisted
when they were sold. . . .That brings them within the rule laid down by this court
in Gelpcke v. The City of Dubuque." Swayne, J., in Havemeyer v. Iowa City, 3 Wan.
294, 303 (1865). "The true rule is to give a change of judicial construction in respect to
a statute the same effect in its operation on contracts and existing contract rights that
would be given to a legislative amendment; that is to say, make it prospective, but
not retroactive. . . .We have no hesitation in saying that the rights of the parties are
to be determined according to the law as it was judicially construed to be when the
bonds in question were put on the market as commercial paper." Waite, C. J., in
Douglas v. County of Pike, 101 U. S. 677, 687 (1879). "In our opinion, the rights
of the parties to this suit are to be determined by the 'law as it was judicially construed
to be when the bonds in question were put on the market as commercial paper.'" Waite,
C. J., in County of Rolls v. Douglas, 105 U. S. 728, 732 (1881), quoted by Bradley, J.,
in Green County v. Conness, 109 U. S. 104, 105 (1883). See the quotation from Swayne,
J.'s opinion in Gelpcke v. The City of Dubuque, mpra note 70.
See the statement and discussion of this principle in the writer's Which Law Should
Govern? (1938) 24 VA. L. REv. 748.
215 U. S. 349 (1910).
"Griffin v. Fairmont Coal Co., 59 W. Va. 480 (1909).
'Rowan and Harris v. Runnels, 5 How. 134 (U. S. 1847) ; Supervisors v. Schenck,
5 Wall. 785 (U. S. 1866); Butz v. City of Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575 (U. S. 1869);
Boyce v. Tabb, 18 Wall. 546 (U. S. 1873); Pana v. Bowler, 107 U. S. 529 (1882);
Barber v. Pittsburg, Fort Wayne and Chicago Railway Co., 166 U. S. 83 (1896);
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assumed that decisions are law which a court is obliged to follow ° will the
result be changed by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.
b. Decisions overrided after party relying had changed position
In Gelpcke et al. v. The City of Dubique,81 an Iowa statute authorized
municipalities to issue bonds to be exchanged for the stock of railroad com-
panies to encourage the construction of railroads. In several decisions the
Iowa Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute. After the
City of Dubuque had issued bonds for the authorized purpose, the Iowa
Supreme Court, reversing its previous decisions, held that the statute violated
provisions of the state constitution and was invalid. The holder of the bonds
sued in a federal district court to recover money due on interest coupons.
The district court, applying the last decision, denied recovery. It was reversed
by the United States Supreme Court which held that the late case in Iowa
should not be applied. Justice Swayne said:
"However we may regard the late case in Iowa as affecting the future,
it can have no effect upon the past.... To hold otherwise would be as
unjust as to hold that rights acquired under a statute may be lost by
its repeal."8 2
In many other cases the United States Supreme Court has refused to apply
the decisions of courts of the state whose law was applicable which were
decided after a party had changed his position in reliance on earlier decisions
thus overruled.83
Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 193 U. S. 532 (1903) ; Presidio County
v. Noel-Young Bond and Stock Co., 212 U. S. 58 (1908). Cf. Folsom v. Ninety Six,
159 U. S. 611 (1895), supra note 44.
'Justice Holmes assumed this in his dissent in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., considered
supra at note 77. He said that the state court could make its decisions retroactiye.
In this he was correct as is shown by the cases where there are no previous state court
decisions. He erred in assuming that the state court decision was law. The decision
may have been so unjust and erroneous, as indeed it was, that the state court would
subsequently overrule it.
1 Wall. 175 (U. S. 1863). See Thayer, The Case of Gelpcke v. Dubuque (1891)
4 HAxv. L. REv. 311.
1 Wall. 175, 206 (U. S. 1863).
'Havemeyer v. Iowa City, 3 Wall. 294 (U. S. 1865); Olcott v. The Supervisors,
16 Wall. 678 (U. S. 1872) ;'Douglas v. County of Pike, 101 U. S. 677 (1879); County
of Rolls v. Douglas, 105 U. S. 728 (1881); Green County v. Conness, 109 U. S. 104
(1883). Cf. Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. Martin, 268 U. S. 458 (1925),
supra note 65, and Anderson v. Santa Anna 116 U. S. 356 (1886), supra note 72. In
Olcott v. The Supervisors, supra, Strong, J., said, "This court has always ruled that
if a contract when made was valid under the constitution and laws of a state, as they
had been previously expounded by its judicial tribunals and as they were understood
at the time, no subsequent action by the legislature or the judiciary will be regarded
by this court as establishing its invalidity. Such a rule is based upon the highest
principles of justice." In Douglas v. County of Pike, supra, Waite, C. J., said, "We
recognize fully, not only the right of a state court, but its duty to change its decisions
whenever, in its judgment, the necessity arises. It may do this for new* reasons, or
because of a change of opinion in respect to old ones; and ordinarily we will follow
them, except so far as they affect rights vested before the change was made."
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TYPE OF CASE IN WHICHa RESULT WILL DIFFER
In Black and White Taxicab Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab and Trans-
fer Co.,8 4 the validity of a contract with a railroad company for the exclusive
privilege of bringing cabs into and soliciting business in its station at Bowling
Green, Kentucky, was in question. There were Kentucky decisions holding
such contracts void on the ground that they were detrimental to the public.
The weight of authority elsewhere was contra. The United States Supreme
Court sustained the district court which refused to follow the Kentucky de-
cisions. It said the question was one of general law.
Under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, the federal court would be obliged
to apply the rule of the state decisions since it cannot be said that it would
produce injustice. The Kentucky rule would secure reasonable taxicab fares
through competition. The majority rule would leave the question of reason-
able fares to the city council. It could regulate them in the same way that
railroad rates are regulated. One system is no more just than the other
though the Kentucky system would seem preferable since the question of
reasonable rates is not left to the city council. A decision either way would
be just. In such cases Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins will require the federal
court to apply the local rule. It must be applied when not erroneous or
productive of injustice.
EQUITY CASES
The fact that Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 applies to "trials at
common law" raises the question whether or not it applies to equity cases. It
will be helpful to examine again the full text of the original draft of the
section which is as follows:
law
"And be it further enacted, that the statu. law of the
A
several states, in fcrcc for the time being and thei-r $an
.... N or co:m.nmon 1:A., no44, in use, whether by adoption
frtm: the comnlaw of England, the ancipnt statutees
f h" ...... r otherwise, except where the constitution,
treaties or statutes of the United States shall otherwise
require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision
in the trials at common law in the courts of the United
States in cases where they apply."8 5
"Trials at common law" is ambiguous. "Common law" is first used in the
section as a synonym for "unwritten law", but it cannot mean that in the
phrase "trials at common law" because the section contemplates the applica-
tion of state statutes. It could have been intended either (1) to distinguish
-276 U. S. 518 (1928).
'Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 (1923)
37 HARv. L. REv. 49, 87, supra note 15.
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such trials from equity proceedings, or (2) to mean ordinary court proceed-
ings as distinguished from special statutory proceedings established by federal
law. The latter would seem to be its true meaning.
Mason v. United States 6 and companion cases were equity suits brought
by the United States to quiet title to land in Louisiana, to enjoin defendants
from extracting oil or minerals and to secure an accounting for oil and gas
removed. The District Court found for the United States and applied a
Louisiana statute fixing the measure of damages. The statute required the
deduction of mining or drilling expenses from the value of minerals or oil
removed without right by those acting in good faith. The Circuit Court of
Appeals held that it was error to apply the Louisiana statute. In the United
States Supreme Court it was argued that the words "trials at common law"
in the thirty-fourth section made it inapplicable to equity suits, but the Court
held that the state statute should be applied. Justice Sutherland who wrote
the opinion said that, whether or not the thirty-fourth section was applicable
to equity suits, it was merely declarative of the rule which would be applied
in its absence. So state law will be applied in equity suits.
However, this was subject to the general law doctrine of Swift v. Tysov,
In Black and White Taxicab Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab and Transfer
Co.,87 the Supreme Court sustained a decree enjoining interference with
plaintiff's contract rights on the ground that the district court was not obliged
to follow state court decisions by which the contract was void.
The problems arising with reference to the application of state law are
treated in the same way in equity as they are in actions at law.
CONCLUSION
The problem of Swift v. Tyson is the problem of what is law. It is sub-
mitted that, apart from constitution or statute, law is a practically enforcible
principle of truth, right or justice. Whether or not this is called "general
law" as in Swift v. Tyson is of little importance. Federal courts must apply
state law, but since this is nothing more than principles of truth, right or
justice they must use their independent judgment in ascertaining what that
law is. Since (state) courts can reverse their own decisions, decisions are
not law; but when a party has changed his position relying on a rule applied
in previous decisions which have not been overruled, justice requires the
application of that rule to his case although it would be unjust to apply it
where there had been no such reliance. In such cases the effective time as
of which the authoritatively pronounced rule must be ascertained is the time
of the conduct or event the legal effect of which is in question.
-260 U. S. 545 (1922). See also Brine v. Insurance Co., 96 U. S. 627, 639 (1877);
Missouri Kansas and Texas Trust Co. v. Krumseig, 172 U. S. 351, 358 (1899); and
Johnson, State Law and the Federal Courts (1929) 17 Ky. L. J. 355, 359.
1"276 U. S. 518 (1928), discussed supra at note 84.
